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Over the last few decades we have witnessed an emerging interest in security topics and mechanisms to 
analyse these. In the context of globalization, new threats have appeared (not only interstate, but mainly, 
intra- and trans-state), as well as theoretical approaches (such as Critical Security Studies, CSS) to deal 
with them.  
Regarding the South American region it is useful to consider the constitution of the Unasur as a forum to 
coordinate policies with a very relevant geostrategic and security influence. In this paper, I deal with the 
logics that motivated the birth of the UNASUR project, in order to examine the way this regional project 
acts against different types of security threats and regional crises until 2016-17, when Venezuelan crises 
escalated. Furthermore, empirical evidences are tested with the common characteristics proposed by 
Peoples and Vaughan-Williams for the CSS. 
Some conclusions are drawn as new aspects have been incorporated to the way UNASUR addressed 
regional conflicts (security as a derivate concept and a broader security agenda), while an important 
element remained the same: a state-centric perspective. 
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UNASUR y la perspectiva estadocéntrica de seguridad en Sudamérica 
Resumen 
En las últimas décadas hemos asistido a un creciente interés por los temas de seguridad y cómo 
analizarlos. En el marco de la globalización, han surgido nuevas amenazas (no sólo interestatales, sino 
también intra- y trans-estatales), así como nuevos enfoques teóricos para abordarlos (como los Estudios 
Críticos de Seguridad, CSS). 
En lo que concierne a la región sudamericana resulta oportuno entender el surgimiento de la UNASUR 
como un foro de coordinación de políticas con una importante relevancia geoestratégica y de seguridad. 
En este trabajo, se abordan las lógicas que motivaron el nacimiento de la UNASUR, con la intención de 
analizar cómo este proyecto regional se ha comportado ante los distintos tipos de amenazas de seguridad 
y las crisis regionales hasta el año 2016-17 con la escalada de la crisis venezolana. Además, se evalúan y 
testan las evidencias empíricas en contraste con las tres características comunes de los CSS que señalan 
Peoples y Vaughan-Williams. 
Finalmente, se extraen algunas conclusiones sobre las nuevas particularidades y prácticas que la 
UNASUR ha introducido a la hora de lidiar con conflictos regionales (seguridad como concepto 
derivativo y la ampliación de la agenda de seguridad), mientras que, por el contrario, el tercer 
componente permanecía igual: una perspectiva estadocéntrica. 
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Over the last few decades we have witnessed an emerging interest in security topics and 
mechanisms to analyse them (Williams, 2008; Hughes & Meng, 2011). In the context of 
globalization, characterized by a wide and fast spread of thoughts and the necessity of being part 
of a globalized world, new threats have appeared (not only interstates, but mainly, intra- and 
trans-states), as well as new strategies to solve them out. Critical Security Studies (CSS) have 
modified both the scope and the depth of the “security” concept within the International 
Relations.  
In the specific case of Latin America security, historically intrastate issues have always 
dominated the security agenda. At the same time, we are witnessing nowadays attempts to frame 
some of the security problems in regional and subregional terms through ALBA, UNASUR, and 
CELAC (Kacowicz & Mares, 2016:27). 
In this paper firstly the emergence of the aforementioned CSS is exposed, highlighting 
their potentialities and their contribution in relation to other approaches. Afterwards I deal with 
the logics that motivated the birth of the UNASUR project –understood as a forum to coordinate 
politics with a very relevant geostrategic and security influence- in order to examine the way 
this mechanism acts against different types of security threats. Thus, I focus on the extension of 
the concept of threat from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts –such as political turmoil, 
democratic stability or coup d’état- and trans-state ones –i.e. environmental risks or 
international crime organizations, among others-.  
Indeed, following Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010:23-24), our analyse of the 
security concept in relation to the UNASUR will tackle the three main characteristics shared by 
the CSS: (i) security as a derivative concept, thus a changing idea depending on how we 
understand the world; (ii) the existence of a broader security agenda, apart from national 
defence and sovereignty; (iii) the challenge of going beyond the assumption of the state as the 
unique “referent object of security”. And as a corollary it is inferred the will to transform the 
reality, that is, the normative dimension of these CSS. 
After having studied our case –UNASUR- through the CSS prism, the first two 
characteristics have been rightly proved as having been applied in some empirical cases in 
South America, whereas the state-centric approach remained powerful in the region as seems 
evident when dealing with the progress and setbacks of Latin American regional integration 
(Caballero, 2015). 
The aim of this paper will not be an analysis of UNASUR performance nor to explore 
the suitability of UNASUR participation to deal successfully with regional crises. The focus will 
be on how the idea of security has been modified in the region, partially thanks to the 
conceptual improvements developed within UNASUR. Furthermore, the ongoing crisis in 
Venezuela as well as the collateral effects concerning UNASUR, where 6 out of the 12 
members have suspended their membership leaving the mere existence of the organization at 
stake, is not tackled here although it is a current topic in the field1. 
 
1. Emergence of Critical Security Studies (CSS) 
The meaning of security has always been debated and its precise definition has been 
changing in time depending on the academic and historical context (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). A 
quick theoretical overview is presented here. Firstly, security studies have traditionally 
understood security in terms of material power and the defence of national sovereignty. This 
vision, which was configured as the mainstream of the discipline during the Cold War, 
                                                        
1 As proved by the proliferation of scientific panels and papers on the UNASUR crisis due to the 
Venezuelan conflict as well as the South American regionalism disintegration in the last Latin American 
Studies Association (LASA) academic congress held in Boston (USA), in May 2019 (Last access June 
4th, 2019). Retrieved from  https://lasaweb.org/uploads/lasa2019-program-final_es.pdf 
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emphasizes a military approach and under the label of Strategic Studies put the focus on 
national security (Wolfers, 1952:481-502). The idea of security linked to power and the survival 
of the state in an anarchical world is obviously derived from the dominant theory in 
International Relations, the (neo-) realism. Furthermore, these logics of vulnerability, 
emergency and nuclear threat were strengthened by the behaviourist revolution, which took 
place within the social sciences during the Cold War. To sum up, the combination of a historical 
context of antagonism between two superpowers and the consolidation of new scientific 
approaches constrained the ways that security could be conceived, fostering a definition of 
security linked to national sovereignty, military defence and strategic calculation. 
However, when the Cold War was coming to its end in the 80’s, the emergence of new 
theoretical approaches and the reflectivist turn stimulated complexity and theoretical 
development of the security concept. Indeed since the 80’s new actors (NGO’s, international 
companies, civil society, epistemic communities…) gathered momentum concerning security 
threats and moved these issues out of the exclusive realm of the states. Meanwhile new 
challenges and risks entered into the security agenda, as the Copenhagen School proved through 
their securitization approach (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998). Following this process of 
securitization, there are issues which are susceptible of being included in the security agenda on 
account of performative acts of speech and the relevance conferred to them by some experts as 
well as by the general audience. Thus, this movement from the political realm (where situations 
are “normally” regulated) to the security agenda (where extraordinary and urgent measures are 
adopted) is provoked by a communicative act and the way it is interpreted. In conclusion, the 
securitization process implies a performative act because it produces a new perception of threat 
and classifies an event as an affair not just political but mainly as a menace concerning 
security2.  
Nevertheless, “the emergence of the CSS did not mean the end of the Strategic Studies. 
[Stephen] Walt supported the renaissance of the traditional studies based on the new threats 
posed to the state’s foreign policies (Walt, 1991). Whereas the CSS were spreading over the 
European academy, the Strategic Studies remained the mainstream in the American research 
centres (Waever, 2004)” (De la Flor, 2012:5). In fact, both visions have coexisted in the last 
decades, being one or the other more suitable depending on the focus and, notably, depending 
on the researcher’s departing point; that is, if it is applied a state-centric approach linked to 
national security, or if the individual is emphasized, so linked to a human security with close 
ties with development and well-being. 
In relation to this very last argument, the conceptual contribution coming from the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is remarkable. In its 1994 report3, they 
coined the term “human security”, broadening the aspects concerning security and linking it 
tightly to the individual, at the same time that a distinction between “freedom from want” and 
“freedom from need” was theoretically developed. It should not be forgotten the proliferation of 
these concepts –human rights, democracy, positive peace…- after the end of the Cold War, as 
well as the intention of Western countries to spread them to other regions through “humanitarian 
interventions” and/or applying the postulates of the democratic peace thesis. 
However, the September 11 attack arose as a turning point concerning security studies. 
On the one hand, security issues came to the top of the political agenda, affecting both foreign 
policy and domestic affairs debates. In certain way, this event resituated the security concept in 
the traditional national dimension, strengthening the idea of order and protection that the states 
have always claimed for them. On the other hand, against this Neorealist perspective, new 
                                                        
2 Inversely, a process of de-securitization is also possible when an issue is not anymore considered a 
security issue, guided by exceptionality, but it is reassumed as a normal issue addressed through daily 
politics. 
3 Report on Human Development, elaborated by the UNDP in 1994. Retrieved from 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_1994_es_completo_nostats.pdf  (last access September 26, 
2018). 
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“schools” developed other concepts of security in both the ontological and the epistemological 
level (CASE Collective, 2006).  
In that sense, apart from the aforementioned Copenhagen School, we find the 
Aberystwyth School4, in Wales, with influences from the Frankfurt School and the idea of 
conflict and critical theory developed by Robert Cox (Cox & Sinclair, 1996). Coming from 
there, they state that the basis of security is the emancipation of individuals and, therefore, 
neither power nor order are the key element to guarantee security, but emancipation understood 
in terms of welfare and the absence of domination and constraints. Applying a critical approach, 
it is underlined how the security concept, limited by the state order and the preservation of the 
status quo, has been historically used at the expense of emancipatory possibilities.  
Indeed, the extension of the meaning of security and the inclusion of new threats –such 
as poverty or social exclusion- in a more comprehensive definition, could provide room for 
further changes in the real world. As it seems obvious, this approach is highly normative and 
aims to elaborate a prescriptive theory which could have influence in the empirical arena. And 
this emancipatory goal is paramount, although it is not defined how it could be applied into 
reality and, in addition, how someone could reach a total emancipation without provoking new 
forms of domination upon “others”. 
Finally, the Paris School5, in debt to political sociology in general and authors such as 
Foucault and Bourdieu in particular, tackles security from a broader perspective than the 
International Relations discipline. This approach is mainly focused on practices, on contexts and 
on daily acts and resistance behaviours, rather than a specific international event nor a speech 
act. Therefore, their research agenda deals with the professionals of security, the agents who 
apply and deliver (in)security and the technological devices deployed to control the population. 
Following this argument, one of the main concepts would be governmentality, understood as a 
way to control people’s practices. 
Although several nuances and specificities arise from each one of these critical 
approaches to security, it can be stated that these CSS could act in a complementary way, fading 
away their respective differences among the Paris, Aberystwyth and Copenhagen Schools 
(CASE Collective, 2006). To exemplify these meeting points, I highlighted three shared 
characteristics (Peoples& Vaughan-Williams, 2010:23), which I will test within our study case: 
(i) security as a derivative concept; or in other words, security is not an unequivocal term, but its 
meaning depends on the ontology from where you depart. For example, from the dominant 
neorealist vision of International Relations, if the world is understood as a system of 
international anarchy, composed by interacting units –rational, homogeneous and unitary states-
, which strengthen their material capacities in order to succeed in a cyclical struggle for 
survival, the security would be linked to the protection and conservation of that “billiard ball” –
i.e. national sovereignty- in face of threats coming from “outside”.  
On the contrary, if applying other approaches tied to an ontology closer to individuals, 
such as international political sociology, or an ontology based on a “world socially constructed”, 
such as constructivism, just to give a couple of examples, security would be perceived in a very 
different way. Thus, respectively it would be attached to the individual protection and/or 
welfare (even against the very national state) or it would be attached to our own perceptions of 
the threats and the psychological construction of the “other” as friend or foe. 
Secondly, (ii) the existence of a more comprehensive security agenda is a common 
characteristic which leads us beyond material capacities. In this case, security is not just about 
territorial integrity, where the military dimension could be decisive, but also other “sectors” are 
quite relevant, for example, environmental risks, political and socio-economic challenges… In 
certain way, the number of threats is increased because of the rising range of common goods 
                                                        
4 The Aberystwyth School is integrated by authors such as Ken Booth or Richard Wyn-Jones, among 
others. 
5Authors as Didier Bigo or Jef Huysmans are actively participating within this Paris School. 
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expected to be protected, from democratic stability to human rights and health, and also 
including environmental protection and sustainable development. 
And, lastly, the third characteristic (iii) is related to the assumption of the state as the 
“referent object of security”. In this sense, having recognized that the CSS aspire to overcome 
the state-centric perspective6, these critical approaches agree that the state cannot be the unique 
and central element, though they disagree about the ones who have to be secured and protected: 
the individual as a human being, the community, our society, “us”, every life within the 
planet… 
As stated by Tickner and Herz, “contrary to human security discourse, however, 
democratic security never identified human beings as its object of study. The fact that human 
security has never been widely embraced by Latin American scholars points to its essential 
misfit with regional approaches that are by nature statist and are part of the region’s long-
standing tradition to view the state as an agent of modernization” (Tickner and Herz, 2012:105). 
Furthermore some scholars will propose a decolonial approach not just to hypothetically 
incorporate non-humans as referent objects of security but rather to explore the potentialities of 
the pluriverse, instead of a “one-world world” (Blaney & Tickner, 2017). 
Once I have quickly presented these theoretical perspectives on security studies inside 
the International Relations discipline, I will explain the origins of UNASUR and how the 
security concept fits into this regional entity, at least until 2016-7 when the liberal-conservative 
shift in Latin America (Sanahuja, 2019), together with the ongoing Venezuelan crisis escalated 
even more generating regional outcomes, including a humanitarian crisis in their borders. I 
stress our interest on the conceptual development at the regional level, rather than the specific 
debate about who tackles these threats, such as transnational crime or if the measures taken are 
strictly bilateral and not regional7. Additionally I argue from the beginning that the UNASUR is 
born not just to face traditional threats –as interstate classic wars- or to deal with security just in 
material terms. On the contrary, from its birth the UNASUR would enjoy a broad security 
agenda8 while trying to solve out old and new threats along the security field. 
 
2. UNASUR and the concept of security  
The origins of the UNASUR date back to the emergence of the South American 
Community of Nations (CSN), which was created by the Cuzco Declaration in 2004. The initial 
objective was to join every South American country in a sort of Andean Community (CAN) 
plus Mercosur plus Chile, Guyana and Surinam. In other words, “in this summit the three initial 
elements for a South American regional project are established. The first one is the coordination 
of foreign policies, in order to confirm South America as a regional group in the international 
arena. The second one is the convergence of the CAN, Mercosur, Chile, Guyana and Surinam in 
a South American Free Trade Area. And the third one is the energetic, telecommunications and 
physical integration of South America through the IIRSA” (Sanahuja, 2011:124-125; 2007:20).  
This project was led from Brasilia and it was designed following the main lines drew by 
Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso during the first South American Presidents 
Summit in 2000. Since then, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs –Itamaraty- made a 
terminological shift and started talking about South America, as the natural geographical region 
for Brazil, instead of Latin America, thus excluding Central America and, more significantly, 
México. 
                                                        
6 It is important to point out that the securitization theory coming from the Copenhagen School does 
affirm a statist point of view, even if they introduce other relevant actors. On the contrary, approaches 
coming from Aberystwyth and Paris firmly opposed any state-centric perspective. 
7 In this sense, on the lack of a coherent regional structure to deal with collective security, see among 
others Muggah & Diniz (2013:19).  
8 Other authors, even if they are not clearly situated under the umbrella of the CSS, stress the expansion 
of the security concept (Battaglino, 2008:25-27). 
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Afterwards, the evolution from the CSN to the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR) (Briceño Ruiz, 2010:103-121) made clear the relevance of Venezuelan president 
Hugo Chavez and Bolivian president Evo Morales to redefine some bias of the project. From 
their position as leaders of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), 
both presidents persuaded the other presidents9 to broaden the competences of the UNASUR 
project with a multidimensional scope, including environmental issues, development and 
energetic issues, social dimension…and, obviously, security issues.  
Finally an eclectic position between the leaderships of Venezuela and Brazil was 
adopted and the UNASUR was configured in 2007 as the minimum shared by all the different 
presidents and ministries of foreign affairs in South America (Briceño Ruíz, 2010:118). 
Therefore, in the Isla Margarita Summit in 2007 a new name was chosen, “Unión de Naciones 
Suramericanas (UNASUR)”, and subsequently, in May 2008, the Constitutive Treaty was 
signed in Brasilia, though it did not get formally into force until March 2011 when the ninth 
country –Uruguay- ratified it. 
It cannot be forgotten other temporary circumstances which contributed to the 
emergence and development of UNASUR. Concerning geopolitics, the increasing American 
indifference towards the region gave more room and autonomy for these regional actors and, 
mainly, to Brazil aspirations of setting the regional agenda. Furthermore, the rise of China as a 
new economic pole changed some of the traditional rationales in the region.  
Indeed, some of the regional economies took advantage from the high prices of 
commodities and modified their foreign policies in order to build economic bridges to Asian 
markets. Paradoxically, what seemed a more autonomous region in relation to the United States 
turned into a reprimarization of the export pattern, implying an increasing dependence to Asia-
Pacific region and, mainly, to China. 
In geopolitical terms, UNASUR behaved as a concentric circle within the Latin 
American integration10. Therefore, starting from the smallest one, that is, the strategic 
association between Buenos Aires and Brasilia, this close relation acts as a glue to consolidate 
democracy and regional stability. A good example of this first Argentinian-Brazilian ring would 
be the “inwards” democratic consolidation developed by Presidents Raúl Alfonsín and José 
Sarney in the 80’s, supported by the “outwards” elimination of the risks of war between these 
two “antagonistic” countries. 
Then, Mercosur played a relevant role in economic as well as socio-political integration. 
In this sense, the increasing economic interdependence during the 90’s took place while 
developing an incipient political institutional design as well as shared labour regulation or 
education system. 
Moving up in these concentric circles, UNASUR represents a forum for political 
coordination focused on two main issues: (i) security and stability for the region, and (ii) 
energy, transport communications and infrastructures, notably through the aforementioned 
IIRSA11, which was launched in the first Summit of South American Presidents, which took 
place in Brasilia in 2000. 
Following this concentric circles’ rationale, the next ring would was Community of 
Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), created in 2010 and with diffused objectives. 
                                                        
9 It is indispensable to underline how highly presidentialist Latin American foreign policies are, as 
scholars such as Sean Burges (2017) have proved. 
10 For a slightly different interpretation of the concentric circles theory posed in this work, see Serbín 
(2008:142). 
11 In this case, once again, it is suitable to notice not just the wishes, but the logics under these initiatives. 
Thus, the achievements of a bi-oceanic corridor are in Brazil’s intentions to have an easier (and cheaper) 
access to the Pacific ports in order to increase their exports to Asia. This similar nationalist rationale 
could be found in the case of the CDS as a platform for developing their military industry while selling 
more weapons to the regional neighbors. 
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Indeed, the CELAC acted as a forum where the friendly picture of the “big Latin American 
family” was taken. These meetings enabled the presidents to know each other and even to solve 
some bilateral tensions out. However, due to their ideological differences and the lack of any 
institutional body, their consensuses were just in big themes such as peace promotion or respect 
to human rights, where no specific measure was taken nor any decision was compulsory. At the 
end of the day, an important aim for the CELAC was to gain actorness in the international 
arena, so they could talk as a unique voice, which could be representative of the Latin American 
leaders (Sanahuja, 2014:75-108). But the lack of accountability made it increasingly inefficient. 
After having quickly presented a picture of Latin American regionalism at the beginning 
of the 21st century, I go back to the security dimension in relation to UNASUR. As some has 
pointed out, the emergence of UNASUR with a security agenda was remarkable because “that 
proposal produced a new fact in the hemisphere: for the first time, South American countries 
discuss a common defence agenda without any extraregional intermediary, notably, without the 
direct presence of the United States” (Rodrigues & Rodrigues, 2011:218). The common 
understanding among some diverse political projects of the region (Caballero, 2011) –
notwithstanding their ideological differences12- provoked the creation of a specific forum such 
as UNASUR and, furthermore, the security issues were incorporated as something suitable and 
valuable for the region itself. 
Throughout several meetings of the Ministers of Defence of UNASUR member states, 
the idea of security understood as broader than mere defence against external material menaces 
was conceived. In this sense, some new risks and threats were included, such as the case of 
extreme poverty (Kalil Mathias, Cavaller Guzzi & Avelar Giannini, 2008:75). This definition 
process ended in the Summit of Costa do Sauipe, Brazil, in December 2008, where the 
presidents of the member states of UNASUR approved the statute which created the South 
American Defence Council (CDS, for its acronym in Spanish). From the beginning, the project 
launched by Brazilian president Lula da Silva had been supported by all the other governments, 
except the Colombian one, who perceived it as a sort of reprobation against their military 
agreements with the United States. Nevertheless, diplomatic negotiations deployed by Brazilian 
Minister of Defence, Nelson Jobim, and the explicit declaration that this regional mechanism 
did not intend to interfere in the US-Colombia relations facilitated the definitive creation of the 
CDS in its first summit in Santiago de Chile, March 2009. The general objectives of the CDS 
were the consolidation of South America as a peace zone, the development of a South American 
identity in security affairs and the generation of consensus in order to foster regional 
cooperation13. 
 
3. Regional crises and security menaces addressed by UNASUR 
Before examining the security concept in the UNASUR context, it would be suitable to 
mention the main crises and security menaces where UNASUR has participated as an 
intercessor or as a discussion forum for each part. Meanwhile I will test these empirical facts 
related to South American conflicts with the aforementioned theoretical characteristics proposed 
by Peoples and Vaughan-Williams in relation to the CSS approach. 
The first event analysed is the one concerning the risk of internal secession in Bolivia in 
2008. The case of this domestic crisis, which was motivated by the constitutional reform 
launched by president Morales, reached its peak with the killing in Porvenir-Pando, September 
11, 2008. In this case, UNASUR –indeed, even before having formally entered into force- 
obtained the political legitimacy to mediate between the secessionists prefects from the eastern 
                                                        
12 One of the strongest examples would be the blockade of the international bridge between Uruguay and 
Argentina in Gualeguaychú, which launched a deep bilateral conflict between both countries. This tension 
between presidents Néstor Kirchner and Tabaré Vázquez was increasing from 2005 and it was not 
moderated until 2010, when two different presidents (Cristina Fernández and José Mujica) were in office. 
13 For more information, see the CDS website: http://unasursg.org/es/node/21 (last access June 3, 2019). 
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regions and the government of president Morales. This fact becomes even more relevant on 
account of the place where a paramount Bolivian affair was discussed: the Chilean presidential 
Palacio de La Moneda, as Chile was holding the rotating presidency of the UNASUR in that 
second semester of 2008. Therefore, the historical enmity between Bolivia and Chile was 
partially overcome by UNASUR in order to foster regional stability (Aín, 2012). Furthermore, 
concerning this crisis, apart from going beyond the classical security agenda of national 
sovereignty and material defence, the meaning of security is perceived as a derivative concept, 
i.e., measures for Bolivian stability are taken by an external institution –UNASUR- which has 
gained enough regional legitimacy –due to the negotiations led by Lula da Silva and Michelle 
Bachelet-, so the very concept of security has been regionalized. 
The second crisis presented is the one related to the American military bases in 
Colombia, which was tackled in the summit of Bariloche, August 2009. Although the meeting 
showed a notable regional disagreement on security cooperation, UNASUR was proved as a 
valid interlocutor where these differences could be settled. Member states, which have 
previously put pressure on Colombian government, were satisfied after having Colombia stated 
that the military agreement did not diminish national sovereignty nor territorial integrity of any 
South American country. So, in this case –and also in the following examined crisis- the 
security concept is closer to a traditional vision, with a state-centric nuance (“in terms of the 
referent object of security”), a limited material and defence agenda (“not a broad agenda”) and a 
security approach linked to a neorealist and anarchical international system (“in terms of the 
derivative concept of security”). 
The third crisis addressed by UNASUR can also be considered as a “classical” one, that 
is, an interstate conflict. After the Colombian bombing of a FARC battalion in Ecuadorian soil, 
an initial friction between Ecuador and Colombia arose. Afterwards, Venezuela regionalized the 
conflict and continued the escalation. Thus, the declared enmity between presidents Hugo 
Chávez and Álvaro Uribe, resulted in a bilateral pre-war situation. It is interesting to notice why 
the Organization of American States (OAS) was not legitimized to intervene as it was perceived 
as dominated by the USA, so pro-Colombia. Brazil and Argentina took advantage from this 
situation to give more relevance to UNASUR, with the new general secretary Néstor Kirchner. 
The former Argentinean president met both Uribe and Chávez in August 10, 2010, and 
announced a détente between both countries. Although no compulsory decision was taken nor a 
definitive solution was achieved, UNASUR succeeded at self-presenting once again as a 
guarantor of peace and regional stability and the only one capable of avoiding a hypothetical 
aggression between two South American neighbours.   
The fourth crisis tackled here deals with the police rebellion and the so-called coup 
d’état in Ecuador. In September 30, 2010, an internal crisis put president Correa in jeopardy and 
subsequently, the preservation of democracy and stability in this Andean country. UNASUR 
promptly convened a presidential meeting in Buenos Aires with the aim of supporting the 
regional commitment with democracy and, therefore, their political backing to the legitimate 
president Correa. In order to make even more explicit this support, a meeting among the 
ministers of foreign affairs of UNASUR member states was set for October 1st in Quito. In 
conclusion, UNASUR did not just solve this political menace out, but they also took advantage 
to set a precedent concerning the safeguard of democratic regimes in order to avoid other 
hypothetical coups in the future in the South American region. 
The outcomes of this crisis were quite relevant –and it will be meaningful for the 
following crisis mentioned below-. In this case, the derivative concept of security meant here 
the respect for democratic legality. This fact implied an evident extension of the security agenda 
not just because it was a domestic conflict instead of an interstate one, but also because 
democracy was regionally protected as a value, as a regional common good. The palpable 
evidence was the elaboration of a consequent democratic clause for UNASUR member states. 
Finally, the “referent object of security” was ambiguous. Although the vision was clearly state-
centric in this case, it could also be argued that the main –and ultimate- beneficiary of 
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democratic stability was the citizenship, the society as a whole, thus it would go beyond the 
state as the referent object to be protected. 
The fifth crisis examined here is related to the removal of Paraguayan president 
Fernando Lugo in June 2012 due to an impeachment process launched by the legislative branch, 
coming into office his vice-president Federico Franco. The governments of the UNASUR 
member states interpreted that the procedure applied had not been legal nor respected 
democratic guarantees. Therefore, UNASUR, honouring the democratic clause of UNASUR (as 
well as the Mercosur one)–and also due to the empathy with the outgoing president and other 
political strategies such as the expected Venezuelan adhesion to Mercosur, which are out of our 
current scope in this paper-, decided to suspend Paraguay from UNASUR until democratic order 
was recovered. In April 2013, a new president was democratically elected, Horacio Cartes, and 
the negotiations to a formal re-entry of Paraguay in UNASUR quickly developed. In the case of 
this crisis it would be applicable the arguments exposed for the precedent crisis, as it was a 
domestic issue with regional outcomes, where UNASUR decided to intervene on behalf of 
democratic values, overcoming the classical limits in terms of security linked to external and 
material menace. 
Lastly, it is worthy to mention a couple of ideas on the ongoing Venezuelan crisis 
despite the lack of temporal perspective to properly analyse it. After the death of president Hugo 
Chávez and the electoral victory of his successor, Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela was (and still is) 
living under a dramatic economic crisis as well as a socio-political one. Since the very first 
moments of social revolts against the government, UNASUR has been criticised for not being 
able to bridge mediation channels between the two antagonistic positions inside Venezuela. 
Even if the Venezuelan crisis could be interpreted as a tour-de-force for UNASUR survival14, 
what is analysed in this paper is neither UNASUR’s performance nor its suitability to cope with 
regional tensions, but how it has had a say to shape the concept of security in the region. In this 
sense, it is not an analysis of why UNASUR intervened in some cases and not in others, but 
what were the main rationales argued to justify its leading role in some of the aforementioned 
conflicts. 
 






Type of threat 
Internal secession 
in Bolivia in 2008 
Yes Yes No Intra-state 
 (uti possidetis 
iure) 
Military bases in 
Colombia, 2009 





No No No Interstate 
(“classical”) 
Police rebellion in 
Ecuador, 2010 





Yes Yes Ambiguous Intra-state 
(democratic 
clause) 
Source: The author, 2019 
 
 
                                                        
14 Apart from the 6 members (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Perú and Paraguay) that decided to 
suspend their membership to UNASUR in August 2018, Colombia and Chile have launched a new 
regional mechanism, “Prosur”, in order to substitute UNASUR. 
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What has been proved by this quick overview of the regional crises addressed by 
UNASUR is the different nature of the conflicts as well as the fast-growing relevance of this 
regional mechanism to play as a valid intermediate and to be considered legitimised to intervene 
in domestic conflicts –at least in the first years since its creation. In relation to the nature of 
regional conflicts, it is noticeable how an increasing number of crises were internal and not 
interstate, which were the traditional ones in terms of security. That reinforced the already 
mentioned paradox in Latin America where a statist perspective in security was the theoretical 
mainstream, although intrastate violence was more relevant (and more likely) than interstate 
conflicts. 
Indeed the domestic crises would not have been addressed by an external entity, unless 
this entity had a remarkable legitimacy recognized for all members. This was the case of 
UNASUR, from its birth until the escalation of the Venezuelan crisis, where polarization burned 
every bridge so mediation, such as the one proposed by UNASUR, became futile. 
Nevertheless, the argument related to the legitimacy amassed by UNASUR for several 
years was not a minor achievement. Its capacity to intervene in domestic affairs, mainly in a 
geographic region such as South America, where Public International Law and, more precisely, 
the uti possidetis iure principle has been profusely developed, was remarkable. In other words, 
the traditional South American opposition to foreign intervention and aggressions to their 
autonomy and/or territory found an exception when talking about a regional entity -not an outer 
one (Duarte Villa &Trindade Viana, 2010: 104)- with a powerful recognised legitimacy in its 
first years of existence. 
 
Conclusions  
In this paper I have tried to analyse the role played by UNASUR in several regional 
crises from 2008 to 2016-7 in order to see if it fitted into the broader security concept coined 
and developed by the Critical Security Studies. As mentioned before, the idea of security is a 
derivative concept which depends on our understanding of the world. Following these CSS 
shared characteristics, UNASUR, apart from developing a consensus forum to strengthen 
regional cooperation, consolidating South America as a peace zone and fostering a South 
American common identity –as underlined by the three main objectives of the CDS-, 
represented a comprehensive security agenda, i.e., broader than the traditional interstate 
conflicts. In fact, UNASUR mainly dealt with internal crises affecting democratic stability. 
Indeed, Ecuadorian crisis in September 2010 was in the origin of the UNASUR democratic 
clause, which recognised sanctions in case of any coup d’état in the region. Indeed, this 
democratic clause was the one applied for the Paraguayan crisis in 2012 and the consequent 
temporary suspension of Asunción from the UNASUR. 
Furthermore, transnational risks have also been addressed by several regional groupings 
within UNASUR15. Therefore, following the objectives of the CDS, regional cooperation did 
also mean the exchange of information on military purchases to avoid regional mistrust (linked 
to a traditional rationale of security), as well as coordinated military exercises which foster 
shared identity and mutual trust among the different actors, or common agreements against 
organised crime and environmental disasters (thus, closer to a more comprehensive 
understanding of security). 
However, concerning the characteristics stated by Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, the 
more problematic is the one related to the state-centric approach. In spite of an effort to seek 
new “referent objects of security” beyond the state –such as the citizen’s well-being or the 
regional community as a whole-, I argue that this element was not really applying in the case of 
                                                        
15 For instance, the “High level working group on management in case of disasters”, created in August 
2013 after the outcomes produced by the earthquake and tsunami, which affected Chile in March 2013, as 
well as the “South American Council on citizen security, justice and coordination of actions against 
Transnational Organized Crime”, created in November 2012. 
Cuadernos de Política Exterior Argentina (Nueva Época), 129, junio 2019, pp. 7-19 




UNASUR’s practices. The aforementioned crises were strictly statist –at least in their origins- 
and, even more important, those crises were addressed by the presidents of the member states of 
UNASUR, reinforcing the idea that political decisions are adopted from the capitals.  
Indeed, even if a regional identity was invoked, the national political agenda and 
domestic priorities were the ones that had more impact on UNASUR. So, even if national 
loyalty and regional identity are in permanent tension and they act in a sort of historical struggle 
between these two rationales (Caballero, 2015:43-60), at the end of the day South American 
diplomacy is mainly interpresidentialist and each president talks on behalf of his/her own 
nation-state (Burges, 2017; Malamud. 2003). This national prevalence seems stronger because 
the one called to be the regional leader, Brazil, was reluctant to pay any cost of being considered 
a hegemon. In fact, most of the times, Brazilian decisions in regional affairs were closer to be 
explained by national interests –though not fully satisfactory- rather than seen as regional 
improvements. In this sense, due to this limited Brazilian view, UNASUR could be understood 
as a mere way to stabilize the region in order to use it as a springboard to project itself in the 
international as a global player (Malamud, 2011; Caballero, 2011).  
According to this argument, UNASUR was not able to fulfil the CSS requisite 
concerning the overcoming of state-centric perspective. Insofar as democratic stability could be 
interpreted as protecting citizen’s well-being  –so the main beneficiary of this security would be 
the citizenship or the society as a whole-, it could be argued that the traditional state-centric 
security was moving to incorporate also the individual, understood as “a relevant object” to be 
protected. Nevertheless, from the facts analysed here it is proved that, while changes have been 
taking place in terms of a broader security agenda and the meaning of security as a derivative 
concept, in the specific case of the state-centric perspective, this statist vision was still the 
dominant approach concerning security issues in the South American realm. In this sense, one 
of the main features of Latin American studies on security –statecentrism-16 remains the same, 
mainly due to the fact that “realist assumptions continue to inform the debate on security, even 
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